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SWIMMING IN ECJ CASE LAW:THE ROCKY JOURNEYTO EU LAW
APPLICABILITY INTHE CONTINENTAL SHELFAND EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONE
JAAP WAVERIJN* AND CECIEL NIEUWENHOUT**
Abstract
Regarding activities taking place at sea, the applicability of EU law
depends on the nature and geographic location of the activity as well as on
the formulation of the geographical scope of the legal instrument. With
Member States’ ever-increasing activity at sea, the ECJ is confronted with
various questions on the application of EU law at sea; its case law is
analysed in this article. Firstly, the foundation of EU competence at sea in
public international law and EU law is explored. Secondly, the line of ECJ
case law is analysed. Thirdly, the interplay between the legislature’s
formulations and the Court’s reasoning is addressed, as well as the
validity of the latter in light of public international law. The article
concludes by reflecting on the consequences of the Court’s reasoning, with
recommendations regarding alternatives.
1. Introduction
International law of the sea provides the competences and rights of States at
sea. However, the EU is not a State, nor does it have a territory of its own.1
Whereas the EU Treaties and secondary law generally dictate their own
geographical scope, it is often not sufficiently clear to what extent the scope of
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Transmission Networks), a project under the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, grant agreement
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1. See Ziller, “The European Union and the territorial scope of European territories”, 38
Victoria University of Wellington LawReview (2007), 51–64. See also Lenaerts and van Nuffel,
European Union Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para 12-006.
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application extends to maritime areas. This can create legal uncertainty for
various activities at sea, which is notable for instance in the energy sector. This
is of increasing importance as energy activities at sea are increasing at a rapid
pace due to climate change considerations, and new activities are taking place
which may not fit within the current legal framework. Thousands of wind
turbines have been constructed at sea2 to realize renewable energy and
emission reduction targets.3 The number of offshore wind turbines is expected
to multiply within a short period of time as the North Sea area may provide as
much as eight percent of EU electricity supply by 2030.4 To improve the
efficiency of these large-scale operations and promote cross-border trade, an
offshore electricity grid and artificial islands may be constructed in the North
Sea.5 In addition, hundreds of offshore oil and gas production facilities will
have to be removed or re-used in the coming decades.6 Extensive research is
carried out whether re-use is feasible, for example for the production of
hydrogen or CO2-storage, for which many fields in the North Sea are
suitable.7
The Court of Justice has addressed the question of applicability of EU law
at sea in a number of cases throughout the last decades. This line of case law
2. WindEurope, “Offshore wind in Europe. Key trends and statistics 2018”, February 2019,
<windeurope.org/about-wind/statistics/offshore/european-offshore-wind-industry-key-trends-
statistics-2018/> (last visited 12 Mar. 2019).
3. The States bordering the North Sea have committed themselves to the Paris Agreement,
to national renewable electricity production targets and at the EU level through Directive
2018/2001/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Dec. 2018 on the promotion
of the use of energy from renewable sources, O.J. 2018, L 328/82 (the RES Directive) and its
predecessor, Directive 2009/28/EC.
4. See the national plans on offshore wind energy of the EU Member States and, in
particular, Council of the EU, “Political declaration on energy cooperation between the North
Seas Countries” 8673/16 of 13 May 2016, which echoes the 2016 Manifesto Northern Seas as
the Power House of North Western Europe which was signed by 20 Members of the European
Parliament from countries neighbouring the North Seas.
5. E.g. Müller, A Legal Framework for a Transnational Offshore Grid in the North Sea
(Intersentia, 2016), pp. 68 et seq.; Müller, “Legal bases for offshore grid development under
international and EU law: Why national regimes remain the determining factor”, 38 EL Rev.
(2013), 618–637; Nieuwenhout,Designing theTarget Legal Framework for a Meshed Offshore
Grid, PROMOTioN Deliverable 7.2, June 2019, available at <www.promotion-offshore.net/fi
leadmin/PDFs/D7.2_Designing_the_Target_Legal_Framework_for_a_Meshed_Offshore_Grid.
pdf> (last visited 12 July 2019).
6. For an overview of expected decommissioning requirements in different States
bordering the North Sea see e.g. Waverijn and Baljon, “Verslag 29e European energy law
seminar”, 4 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Energierecht (2018), 133–147.
7. Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), A picture of CO2 storage in the UK, learnings from
the ETI’s UKSAP and derived projects, October 2013, <www.eti.co.uk/news/optimising-the-
location-of-ccs-in-the-uk-and-a-picture-of-co2-storage-in-the-uk> (last visited 16 Sept. 2019);
Nederlandse Olie en Gas Exploratie en Productie Associatie (NOGEPA), Potential for CO2
storage in depleted gas fields on the Netherlands Continental Shelf, March 2009.
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still leads to questions, mainly due to the debatable manner in which the ECJ
handles concepts such as territory, sovereignty and sovereign rights. Due to
the formulations used in different cases, some activities at sea are, perhaps
unwittingly, excluded from EU law. However, the problem does not only lie
with the ECJ: it starts with the drafting of EU legal instruments, as these often
do not mention whether the instrument applies to activities at sea beyond the
territorial waters.8 This leads to cases in which the ECJ is expected to judge
whether an instrument of EU law applies to a certain activity at sea, whereas
this uncertainty could have been avoided by the legislature by including a
clearer provision on the scope of application of the instrument.
Although the line of case law is not very recent, it has consequences for
contemporary issues, for instance in the debate around Nord Stream II and
offshore electricity grid developments. In addition, analysis of case law shows
that it bears an impact on, for example, the construction of artificial islands,
maritime scientific research and protection of the marine environment.9 Based
on the ECJ’s interpretation of international law, these activities may be
excluded from the applicability of EU law. This is the result of the
development of a line of ECJ case law around the concept of “sovereign
rights”.
In legal academic literature, the relevant ECJ cases have been addressed
individually,10 or with a view to one specific topic.11 The topic can be placed
within the framework of extraterritoriality and territorial extension in EU law,
as mapped by Scott in recent years.12 In 2012, Mehta discussed the topic in this
Review with a focus on the differing interpretations of the law by the ECJ, the
8. See infra, sections 2.1 and 4.1.
9. These activities are listed in Art. 56(1)b of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS), Montego Bay, 10 Dec. 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
10. Chaumette, “Conflit de juridictions pour un travail effectué dans les eaux territoriales et
sur le plateau continental de deux Etats membres de l’Union européenne”, (2002) Le droit
maritime français, 640–648 (on Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services
Ltd., EU:C:2002:122); Koers, “The external authority of the EEC in regard to marine fisheries”,
14 CML Rev. (1977), 269–301 (on Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6–76, Cornelis Kramer and others,
EU:C:1976:114); Reid and Woods, “Implementing EC conservation law”, 18 Journal of
Environmental Law (2006), 148–160 (on Case C-6/04, Commission v. United Kingdom
(Habitats Directive), EU:C:2005:626); Driguez, “Sécurité sociale des travailleurs des
installations off-shore”, (2012) Europe Mai Comm. nº 3, p. 17 (on Case C-347/10, Salemink v.
Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen, EU:C:2012:17).
11. E.g. Müller (2016), op. cit. supra note 5; Nieuwenhout, op. cit. supra note 5.
12. Scott, “The new EU ‘extraterritoriality’”, 51 CML Rev. (2014), 1343–1380; Scott,
“Extraterritoriality and territorial extension in EU law”, 62 AJCL (2014), 87–126; Scott, “The
global reach of EU law: Is complicity the new effects?” in Cremona and Scott (Eds.), EU Law
Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law, vol. XXVII/2, Collected Courses
of the Academy of European Law (OUP, 2019). As will be shown in this article, in line with
Scott’s definition of territorial extension, the ECJ applies EU law on the basis of a territorial
connection to areas outside the territory of the Member States.
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Commission, and different Member States with regard to the continental
shelf.13 The present article adds a systematic overview of the development of
the interpretation of the Court in its case law and places that against the
background of the applicable public international law.
To set the scene, this article starts with a short elaboration on the rules of
public international law on State competences at sea in section 2. This section
continues with an assessment of the relationship between law of the sea and
EU law and of the geographical scope of application of the EU Treaties.
Together with the provisions on the geographical scope of application of the
legislation which the ECJ has to rule on, these rules form the framework
which the ECJ has to take into account when ruling on the question whether
certain legislative instruments apply to activities at sea. Section 3 sets out the
development of the case law and the ECJ’s reliance on sovereign rights as a
basis for the applicability of EU law. Subsequently, the roles of the legislature
and ECJ in this matter are discussed. The article concludes by reviewing the
consequences of the limiting formulation used by the ECJ, setting out
recommendations for the legislature and ECJ while briefly looking ahead.
2. The foundation of competence at sea
Before analysing the case law of the ECJ, we briefly discuss the rules of public
international law, the foundation for any rule-making jurisdiction at sea, as
well as the provisions on the geographical scope of application of the Treaties.
These matters concern the basis and limits of Union competence and thus of
secondary law, which, confusingly, often contains different terms on its
geographical scope from those in the Treaties.
2.1. Public international law
Public international law governs the existence and limits of the sovereignty
and jurisdiction of States. The law of the sea sets out specific rules as regards
the competences of States at sea. Contemporary law of the sea can mainly be
found in the UNCLOS.14 UNCLOS is the international agreement that lays
down the rights and duties of States at sea, both for coastal States and for
landlocked States. UNCLOS has been ratified by 168 parties.15 From a
13. Mehta, “The continental shelf: No longer a ‘terra incognita’ to the EU”, 49 CML Rev.
(2012), 1395–1422.
14. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as UNCLOS.
15. At the moment of writing, May 2019, UNCLOS is signed and ratified by 167 States and
by the European Union (originally by the EC), see <www.un.org/depts/los/reference_
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historical perspective, customary international law and the 1958 Geneva
Conventions were the main legal instruments on the law of the sea before
UNCLOS entered into force.16 This is relevant for the older cases discussed in
this article.
A main reason why UNCLOS is a relevant instrument for the case law
discussed in this article, is that UNCLOS specifies to what extent coastal
States have jurisdiction at various distances from their shore. This is because
UNCLOS provides for a differentiation in competence based on “maritime
zones”.17 In short, the legal situation in the different maritime zones is as
follows.
In the territorial sea, which extends to up to 12 nautical miles (22.2
kilometres) from the low-water line along the coast, also called the baseline,18
the coastal State is sovereign.19 As a result, the coastal State enjoys the same
powers within the territorial sea as on land, subject to a few exceptions
included in UNCLOS and other international law.20 Thus, the coastal State has
almost full jurisdiction.
Beyond the territorial sea, the jurisdiction of the coastal State is much more
limited. Beyond territorial waters, the continental shelf and the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) stretch for 200 nautical miles from the coastline.21 The
continental shelf comprises the seabed and its subsoil beyond the territorial
sea. It exists ipso facto and ab initio,22 and States enjoy sovereign rights to
explore and exploit natural resources present in the continental shelf, such as
natural gas, oil and mineral resources.23 On the other hand, the EEZ grants
files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.)> (last visited Sept. 2019). Another 14 States
have signed but not ratified the Convention.
16. The Geneva Conventions include the Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 Apr.
1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 Apr. 1958, 499 U.N.T.S.
31. The cases judged under these conventions are Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, Kramer; Case
C-37/00, Weber.
17. UNCLOS’ predecessors, the 1958 Geneva Conventions, also mention different
maritime zones. A main difference is that in UNCLOS, an extra zone, namely the EEZ, is
introduced.
18. Art. 5 UNCLOS.
19. Art. 2 UNCLOS.
20. Art. 2(3) UNCLOS, an important exception is the right of innocent passage, enshrined
in UNCLOS Part II, Section 3. Other exceptions may be formed by international law, related to
e.g. environmental law and the prevention of pollution.
21. Arts. 57 (EEZ) and 76 (Continental Shelf) UNCLOS. The latter contains a number of
exceptions to the 200 nautical mile limit in case the continental shelf stretches further than 200
nautical miles from the coastline.
22. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and the
Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1969, p. 3, paras. 19, 39 and 43.
23. Art. 77 UNCLOS.
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coastal States the same sovereign rights regarding the seabed and its subsoil,
but also concerning the water column above it, allowing for the exploitation of
living resources (fish and aquaculture) as well as other resources such as the
production of energy from the currents and the winds.24 The EEZ does not
exist by itself; it needs to be claimed explicitly by the coastal State. The EEZ
and continental shelf thus partially overlap as coastal States have sovereign
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil on
the basis of both regimes,25 regarding which UNCLOS provides that the
coastal State must exercise its EEZ rights in accordance with the provisions
concerning the continental shelf.26 For the purposes of this article, reference to
the sovereign rights in the continental shelf or EEZ have the same legal
consequences.
Beyond these zones, the legal regime of the High Seas is applicable.27 On
the high seas, coastal States are not sovereign nor do they enjoy sovereign
rights. They can exercise the freedoms of the high seas, which include
navigation and fishing as well as the freedom to lay cables and pipelines.28
This maritime zone is not the focus area of this article and thus will not be
discussed in detail.
The rights granted to coastal States based on the law of the sea cannot be
appraised without taking the framework of customary international law on
“sovereignty” and “jurisdiction” into account. Within their territory, States are
sovereign. As a general rule, States enjoy exclusive control over property and
persons within their territory.29 Outside a State’s territory, this is more
difficult. Jurisdiction based on sovereign rights is more limited than
jurisdiction based on territoriality. It is functional jurisdiction, meaning that
their jurisdiction is limited ratione materiae to the matters explicitly
mentioned in UNCLOS and ratione loci to the mentioned area. Another
limitation of “sovereign rights” is that in the enjoyment of its sovereign rights,
the coastal State cannot impede the freedom of navigation, overflight and the
laying of pipelines and cables that are granted to all States and private actors
alike. This holds for all maritime zones except for the territorial sea.30
24. Arts. 55–57 UNCLOS.
25. Arts. 56 and 77 UNCLOS.
26. Art. 56(3) UNCLOS.
27. It must be noted that many provisions of this regime do apply in the EEZ pursuant toArt.
58(2) UNCLOS. However, this is not of particular relevance for the purposes of this article.
Moreover, the closest area to the EU beyond national jurisdiction is part of the Atlantic Ocean,
as all closer areas are part of a continental shelf and/or EEZ.
28. Art. 87 UNCLOS.
29. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of International law, 8th ed. (OUP, 2012), p. 448.
30. Arts. 56(2), 78 and 79, junctoArt. 87 UNCLOS.
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2.2. UNCLOS and EU law
All Member States of the EU have signed and ratified UNCLOS. Moreover,
the EU itself has also signed and ratified this convention.31 Concerning the
question of the relationship between international law and EU law, the ECJ
has delivered a number of relevant judgments. In cases such as Intertanko,
ATAA, Racke and Aktiebolaget, the ECJ recognizes that the EU – inter alia
pursuant to Article 3(5) TEU – must respect international law.32 In addition, in
Intertanko, the ECJ ruled that international law may influence the validity of
secondary EU law.33 The ECJ considers that the EU, based on its obligation to
act in accordance with international law, is also limited by the boundaries of
UNCLOS and that UNCLOS therefore limits the powers of the EU in the same
way as it limits the powers of the Member States.34 The ECJ has ruled on the
limitations provided by UNCLOS in several cases. In Poulsen, the Court
spelled out that UNCLOS grants coastal States broad but not unlimited
powers in the territorial sea, as coastal States have to respect third State rights
such as the right of innocent passage.35 In Aktiebolaget, the ECJ recognized
that the sovereignty of the coastal States is limited in the EEZ and CS as a
result of international law.36
In this context, the declaration made by the European Community at the
time of ratification of UNCLOS, 1 April 1998, is also pertinent.37 In this
declaration, the Community accepted, for the matters for which competence
31. See Council Decision of 23 Mar. 1998 concerning the conclusion by the European
Community of the United Nations Convention of 10 Dec. 1982 on the Law of the Sea and the
Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI thereof, O.J. 1998, L
179/1. See further, Paasivirta, “The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea”, 38 Fordham International Law Journal (2015), 1045.
32. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget NN. v. Skatteverket, EU:C:2007:195; Case C-308/06, The
Queen, on the Application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, EU:C:2008:312, para 51; Case
C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp.,
EU:C:1992:453, paras. 9 and 10; Case C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v.
Armement Islais SARL, EU:C:1993:906, paras. 13–15; Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co.
v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, EU:C:1998:293, para 45; Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of
America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (ATAA),
EU:C:2011:864, para 101.
33. Case C-308/06, Intertanko, paras. 43 and 45.
34. Case C-286/90, Poulsen, para 9.
35. Ibid., para 25.
36. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget, para 59.
37. Declaration concerning the competence of the European Community with regard to
matters governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Dec. 1982 and
the Agreement of 28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention, O.J.
1998, L 179/129.
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has been transferred to it by its Member States,38 the rights and obligations
that UNCLOS lays down for States. The declaration lists the areas in which
the European Community has exclusive or shared competences with relevance
to different activities at sea. Moreover, it provides an enumeration of all
Community legislative acts relevant in this context that were applicable at the
time of ratification.39 This declaration was relied upon by the ECJ in theMox
Plant case40 as a useful reference base for determining which subjects are
covered by Community measures; these subjects fall within Community
competence and should be adjudicated by the ECJ.41 In Mox plant, the ECJ
strongly emphasized that international agreements cannot affect the allocation
of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and thus the autonomy of the legal
system of the EU.42 In extension thereof, it is no stretch to argue that the ECJ
is of the opinion that UNCLOS also cannot affect the interpretation of the
Treaties as regards the provisions dealing with the geographical scope of
application.
2.3. Geographical scope of the treaties and secondary law
Any competence the EU enjoys is by the grace of its Member States, who have
bestowed the EU therewith through the EU Treaties.43 As the Member States
can only confer this competence when they have competence in the first place,
the Member States’ jurisdiction under public international law is also
discussed. Still, the Treaties serve as a starting point when discussing the legal
basis of EU law applicability at sea.44
Article 52(1) TEU contains a general rule on the scope of application of the
Treaties, providing that “the Treaties shall apply to the Kingdom of Belgium,
38. The transferral of competences from Member States to the EU is based on Arts. 1 and
5 TEU in conjunction with Arts. 3 and 4 TFEU.
39. <www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#Europe
anCommunity> (last visited 1 May 2018), European Community, Declaration made upon
formal confirmation.
40. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), EU:C:2006:345, paras. 99,
104–106 and 109.
41. Ibid., paras. 121 and 135.
42. Ibid., para 123.
43. Consolidated version of the Treaty of European Union, O.J. 2016, C 202/13 (TEU);
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. 2016, C
202/47 (TFEU).
44. The treaties complement each other and there is no hierarchy between them. All EU
action, and thus the entire EU law acquis, is governed by the rules enshrined in these two
treaties.
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the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic …” and continues listing the
other Member States. Article 52(2) TEU mentions that the territorial scope of
the Treaties is specified further in Article 355 TFEU. Article 355 TFEU,
however, is concerned with specific territories, such as overseas islands and
other territories which are not connected to the mainland of the Member
States. For present purposes, this provision unfortunately does not offer
further insight.The Treaties thus do not make explicit reference to whether the
EU enjoys the competence to regulate matters on the continental shelf or in the
EEZ of Member States.
In a long line of settled case law, the ECJ has established that secondary law
applies in principle to the same geographical area as the Treaties themselves,
unless the secondary law itself contains a provision explicitly providing
otherwise.45 In addition, secondary law could be interpreted as not extending
to a certain area on the basis of its object and purpose.46 As a result, the
following discussion on the application of EU law at sea concerns not only the
Treaties but also secondary law, unless otherwise stated.
Thus, where relevant, one would expect the geographical scope of
secondary law to be mentioned in the instrument itself. This, however, is not
always the case. In several instances, secondary law is silent on its
geographical scope.47 In other instances, references are made to the
“territories to which the EC Treaty applies”.48 This is problematic, because, as
mentioned above, the treaties do not provide specific information on
geographical application, except in relation to overseas territories. The result
of imprecision on the side of the legislature is that the ECJ has to be creative
with the notions of territory, sovereignty and sovereign rights. The definition
of these terms has been subject to heated debates in public international law
45. Case C-61/77, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:1978:29, para 46; Case C-148/77, H.
Hansen jun. & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt de Flensburg, EU:C:1978:173, para
11; Joined Cases C-132-136/14, Parliament and Commission v. Council, EU:C:2015:813,
paras. 76 and 77; Case C-17/16, Oussama El Dakkak and Intercontinental SARL v.
Administration des douanes et droits indirects, EU:C:2017:341, para 23.
46. A.G. Opinion in Case C-6/04, Habitats, EU:C:2005:372, para 132, referring to Case
C-61/77, Commission v. Ireland, para 30/33.
47. See infra, section 4.1.
48. The most interesting case where this wording is used is in the Declaration submitted by
the EC at the moment of ratification of UNCLOS. The reference to territories in this context is
problematic precisely because UNCLOS mentions areas where States have (functional)
jurisdiction although these areas lie beyond their territory. The same wording is also used in the
EEA Agreement, Brussels 1993, Art. 126. Thus, the same difficulties mentioned here for the
EU may also apply to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It is beyond the scope of this article
to investigate EEA case law on this matter.
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discourse.49 The ECJ has struggled with the interpretation and use of these
terms in its case law as well, as the following analysis shows.
3. Development of ECJ case law:The Court’s journey towards
sovereignty
With case law stretching over several decades, the body of recent case law
points towards a clear rule: EU law is applicable when the activity falls within
the sovereignty of a Member State, which, according to the Court, includes the
sovereign rights enjoyed by coastal States in their EEZ and their continental
shelf. Looking at the historical development of the case law, a clear
development of the reasoning of the Court towards this rule can be seen.
3.1. Reliance on sovereign rights to determine the applicability of EU law
The first case50 in this context is Case C-37/00,Weber. In this case, concerning
a person working on the Dutch continental shelf whose contract was
terminated,51 the ECJ reasoned that work carried out on the continental shelf
should be considered as carried out on the territory of the Member State. The
main question was whether Mr Weber could appeal against the decision to
terminate his contract before Dutch courts on the basis of Article 5(1) of the
Brussels Convention.52 The question was whether the Dutch courts were “the
courts of the place of performance of the obligation in question”.53 As
the Brussels Convention does not contain provisions on its territorial scope,
the ECJ turned to public international law to decide whether the scope of the
Brussels Convention included activities carried out on the continental shelf,54
49. See for an overview on different theories concerning territorial sovereignty, e.g. Torres
Bernardez, “Territorial Sovereignty” in Bernhardt (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (North-Holland, 1987), pp. 823–830; Brownlie, International Law, 4th ed. (OUP, 1990),
p. 287.
50. It could be argued that Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6/76,Kramer is the first case concerning the
extension of Community law at sea. However, Kramer concerned different factual
circumstances, as it concerned the conservation of certain fish species at the high seas, rather
than relating to the continental shelf or EEZ. Despite its relevance, considering that the ECJ
does not refer to Kramer in its later cases, it cannot be argued that Kramer is an integral part of
or formed the start of the line of case law discussed here.
51. Case C-37/00,Weber, para 22.
52. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Brussels, 27 Sept. 1968, O.J. 1972, L 299/32.
53. Art. 5 reads: “A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting
State, be sued: 1. in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of
the obligation in question”.
54. Ibid., para 31.
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and stated that theVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides
in Article 29 that “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its
entire territory”.55
Thus, the ECJ had to judge whether the continental shelf could be
considered part of the territory of a Member State. Referring to Article 5 of
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,56 and to the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases,57 the Court observed that the continental shelf
constitutes a natural prolongation of the land territory under the sea and that
the rights of States in the continental shelf area exist ipso facto and ab initio by
virtue of the State’s sovereignty over the land and extension of that
sovereignty to the seabed in the form of exercise of sovereign rights for the
exploration of the seabed and the exploitation of its natural resources.58 The
ECJ concluded that the work carried out on the Dutch continental shelf should
be regarded as being carried out in the territory of the Member State. The
reasoning in Weber is the start of a reliance on sovereignty and sovereign
rights instead of the broader rule-making jurisdiction which coastal States
have under public international law.59
A subsequent case using similar reasoning is Habitats, which concerned
the transposition of the Habitats Directive by the UK Government.60 Article
2(1) of this Directive provides that “the aim of the directive is to contribute
towards ensuring biodiversity . . . in the European territory of the Member
States to which the EC Treaty applies”.61 The Commission alleged that the UK
limited the application of the provisions transposing the Habitats Directive to
“just natural territory and United Kingdom territorial waters”, while, within
their EEZ, Member States have an obligation to apply Community law in the
55. Ibid., para 29.
56. Convention on the Continental Shelf, cited supra note16. The facts of Weber took place
between 1987 and 1993, thus before the entry into force of UNCLOS on 16 Nov. 1994.
57. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, cited supra note 22, p. 3.
58. Case C-37/00,Weber, para 34. The ECJ also referred to the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases in Case C-347/10, Salemink.
59. The reasoning in Weber was referred to again in Case C-347/10, Salemink. The
reasoning of Salemink was subsequently used in Case C-266/13, L. Kik v. Staatssecretaris van
Financiën, EU:C:2015:188 and Case C-106/11, M.J. Bakker v. Minister van Financiën,
EU:C:2012:328. Kik was then referred to again in the most recent case on this topic, Case
C-631/17, SF v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, EU:C:2019:381. In this last case, it was not
relevant for the ECJ whether the activity at issue fell under the sovereign rights of the coastal
State, as the Court could establish a sufficiently close link in another manner. In footnote 34 of
his Opinion in this case, A.G. Pitruzzella (EU:C:2019:10) did refer to the nature of the activity
and considered whether it fell under the sovereign rights of the coastal State.
60. Case C-6/04, Habitats.
61. Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats
and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive), O.J. 1992, L 206/7,Art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
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fields where they exercise sovereign powers.62 The UK did not contest this
claim.Thus, the ECJ ruled that it was common ground between the parties that
the UK exercised sovereign rights in its EEZ and the continental shelf, and that
it followed that the Habitats Directive was to that extent applicable beyond the
Member State’s territorial waters.63 In other words, the ECJ followed the
reasoning that Member States have to comply with EU law for the continental
shelf and EEZ to the extent that they make use of their rights in these areas.
The ECJ thus relied on the existence of sovereign rights and limited the
application of EU law thereto.
3.2. Lack of sovereign rights limits the applicability of EU law
The development of the reasoning could be called complete when looking at
Aktiebolaget NN v. Skatteverket.64 This case concerned the application of the
Sixth VAT Directive to the construction of a fibre-optic cable linking two
Member States through different maritime zones.65 Article 3(2) of the VAT
Directive provided that it was applicable to the territory of the Member States
as defined in Article 299 EC. Considering the limited wording of Article 299
EC (now Arts. 52 TEU and 355 TFEU), the ECJ ruled that the Treaties did not
provide sufficient guidance on the application of EU law in these maritime
zones, and formulated its own rule: “In the absence, in the Treaty, of a more
precise definition of the territory falling within the sovereignty of each
Member State, it is for each of the Member States to determine the extent and
limits of that territory, in accordance with the rules of international public
law”.66
Interestingly, while the ECJ proclaimed that it was for the Member States to
determine the limits of their territory, the Court continued to explore these
limits itself through discussion of whether different maritime zones are part of
the territory of Member States. In relation to the territorial sea, its bed and
subsoil, Article 2(1) UNCLOS provides that the coastal State is sovereign in
this area.67 The ECJ stated that as a result, this maritime zone is part of the
territory of the coastal State.68 Considering the structure of the argumentation,
62. Case C-6/04, Habitats, para 115.
63. Ibid., para 117.
64. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget.
65. Council Directive 77/388 of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis
of assessment, O.J. 1977, L 145/1, as amended by Council Directive 2002/93/EC of 3 Dec.
2002, O.J. 2002, L 331/27.
66. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget, para 54.
67. Ibid., para 56.
68. Ibid., para 57.
CML Rev. 20191634 Waverijn and Nieuwenhout
the territorial sea is part of the territory because the coastal State is sovereign:
The ECJ equated sovereignty with the territory of the State in this instance,
and decided that VAT was due for the parts of the fibre-optic cable that were
buried in the seabed of the territorial sea.
The same fibre-optic cable continues beyond the territorial sea to the
continental shelf and EEZ. The ECJ recognized that the sovereignty of coastal
States is merely functional in these zones. It considers that in these zones,
sovereignty is limited to the rights laid down in Articles 56 and 77 UNCLOS,
which concern inter alia the exploration and exploitation of the natural
resources of these zones.69 Thus, the Court observed that to the extent that the
supply and laying of an undersea cable are not listed in these articles, these
activities do not fall within the sovereignty of the coastal State and thus fall
outside the field of application of EU law.
The Court thus explicitly concluded that the sovereignty of the coastal State
is limited to what is provided in Articles 56 and 77 UNCLOS and that, when
the activity falls outside these provisions, it cannot be regarded as having been
carried out within the territory of the coastal State in the sense of the Sixth Tax
Directive. This is the case for the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
since, pursuant to the freedom to lay submarine pipelines and cables enshrined
in Articles 58(1) and 79(1) UNCLOS, any State is allowed to lay them.
The Court has since also made this distinction in Kik, explicitly excluding
the laying of cables and pipelines in the continental shelf and EEZ from
Member State jurisdiction and thus from the applicability of EU law.70
3.3. Consequences of the court’s reasoning
The case law shows a clear development towards sovereignty – which,
according to the Court, includes sovereign rights. The reliance of the Court on
sovereign rights goes so far that in Aktiebolaget activities falling outside the
sovereign rights which Member States enjoy were explicitly ruled to fall
outside the field of application of EU law. The exclusion of activities from the
scope of application of EU law is correct in some cases, but not in others.
In the case of interconnectors,71 and other cables and pipelines not used for
the exploitation of resources, such as the fibre-optic cable in Aktiebolaget, the
outcome of the case is arguably correct, as coastal States do not enjoy
69. Ibid., para 59.
70. Case C-266/13, Kik, para 41.
71. An interconnector pipeline is defined in EU law as a line which crosses or spans a
border between Member States for the sole purpose of connecting the national transmission
systems of those Member States: European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/73 of 13
July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing
Directive 2003/55, O.J. 2009, L 211/94, Art. 2(17).
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rule-making authority regarding these cables and pipelines on their
continental shelf and thus may not charge VAT.72
UNCLOS thus creates a seemingly odd situation that a person working on
a pipe-laying vessel sailing under a non-EU flag would in fact be protected by
EU social legislation when the vessel lays pipelines for the extraction of
mineral resources in the continental shelf instead, as this does fall under the
sovereign rights of coastal States, while that same person would not be
protected when working on the laying of a pipeline which functions as an
interconnector.
It may be clear that the application of EU law in these maritime zones
depends on the limitations of jurisdiction included in UNCLOS both ratione
loci and ratione materiae. This means that if the rights of the coastal State are
limited rationemateriae by UNCLOS, for example regarding interconnectors,
this impacts the application of EU law dealing with these matters, as the
Member States cannot confer rights on the EU which they do not enjoy
themselves pursuant to public international law.73 As such, the geographical
area to which EU law applies is not uniform but depends on the subject matter.
EU law may apply if the Member State has a form of jurisdiction on the basis
of public international law and has conferred these powers on the EU.
Considering the open formulation of Article 52(1) TEU74 and the TEU
provisions on the conferral of powers, the competence of the EU extends as far
as the rule-making authority of its Member States if they have conferred this
authority on the EU.75
However, as a result of the formulation used by the ECJ, limiting the
application of EU law to sovereignty and sovereign rights, certain activities
carried out by Member States and within their rule-making authority may be
excluded from the application of EU law. This relates to activities beyond the
territorial sea that States undertake on another legal basis than on the basis of
sovereign rights.This is the case for example for activities described in Article
56(1)(b) UNCLOS, namely the construction of artificial islands, installations
and structures, maritime scientific research and protection of the marine
72. The rights of the coastal State are limited to having to provide consent for the course for
the laying of such pipelines (not cables) on the continental shelf pursuant to Art. 79(3)
UNCLOS.
73. Considering the open formulation of Art. 52 TEU and Arts. 1 and 5 TEU on the
conferral of powers, there is no reason to assume that the geographical scope of EU law is
limited and thus should extend as far as its Member States can exercise powers and have
conferred them on the EU.
74. Considering that Art. 52(2) TEU states that the territorial scope of the Treaties is
specified in 355 TFEU, this implies that Art. 52(1) TEU concerns the material scope of the
Treaties.
75. This is comparable to the approach taken by the ECJ in Joined Cases 3, 4 & 6–76,
Kramer, paras. 30–33.
CML Rev. 20191636 Waverijn and Nieuwenhout
environment.76 This could create ex ante legal uncertainty with regard to the
question whether EU law is applicable to a variety of activities at sea, such as
the re-use of offshore oil and gas installations for purposes not related to the
exploitation of resources in the continental shelf or EEZ,77 and for the
construction of artificial islands.78 When it is unclear whether EU law is
applicable, this has a major impact on a wide range of rules – construction
safety, taxation (VAT), labour law – this also influences the costs of projects
and the attractiveness of these projects to investors.79
4. Interplay between the legislature and the court
The trouble the ECJ has with defining the scope of application of legislation is
in the first place caused by the European legislature, which is not always clear
on the geographical scope it has in mind. In some cases, a provision on the
scope of the legislation is completely missing, in others, the scope is vague or
ambiguous, and finally, in some cases the terminology used excludes, perhaps
unwittingly, application of the instrument at sea, especially when the word
“territory” is used. Thus, the legislature and the ECJ both have a role in
clarifying the applicability of EU law at sea.
4.1. The role of the legislature
It may seem contradictory to focus on the EU legislature in an analysis of the
ECJ’s case law. However, the choices of the legislature play a large role in the
case law under discussion. Mehta analysed that the Commission, the ECJ, and
76. It must be noted that the construction of interconnectors is also excluded from the
applicability of EU law.This is not caused by the reasoning of the ECJ but rather by the structure
of UNCLOS. The Commission, though, seems to be of the opinion that the applicability of EU
law should stretch to interconnectors, for example in the discussion on Nord Stream II. This
appears from the wording of recital 5 of Commission Proposal COM(2017)660 final,
2017/0294 (COD) of 8 Nov. 2017 amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules
for the internal market in natural gas. In this amendment, the Commission proposes that EU
law should apply to interconnectors in the EEZ as well. After trilogues, in the version of 5 Apr.
2019 (2017/0294 (COD) PE-CONS 58/19) this was changed to only the territorial waters, in
recital 9.
77. For example, it is investigated whether this infrastructure can be used for the storage of
CO2. <www.nexstep.nl/re-use/> (last visited Sept. 2019).
78. See e.g. the website of the North Sea Wind Power Hub consortium (TenneT, Energinet,
Gasunie and Port of Rotterdam) <northseawindpowerhub.eu> (last visited Sept. 2019).
79. Verburg and Waverijn, “Liberalizing the global supply chain of renewable energy
technology: The role of international investment law in facilitating flows of foreign direct
investment and trade”, Brill Open Law (2019), 1–39.
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the Member States have diverging opinions on the question when EU law is
applicable to an activity at sea.80 Moreover, in the cases coming before the
Court, the legislature seemingly did not always properly consider the
applicability of legislation to different maritime zones. In particular, in some
cases, the legislature did not include a provision on the geographical scope of
application; and where it did, it seemed unaware of the effects of the
formulation of the provision with regard to the applicability of a legislative
instrument at sea.
A good example of this is Salemink,81 which concerned a regulation on the
application of social security schemes to persons employed within the
Community.82 The question was whether the Dutch Government was
responsible for persons working on installations situated on its continental
shelf. The Regulation provides that persons to whom the Regulation applies
can be subject to the national legislation of only one Member State.83 The
Regulation aimed at relatively wide application, providing that the legislation
of a Member State applies inter alia to persons employed (a) in its territory, (b)
on a ship flying its flag. The ECJ relied on sub (a) and, referring to Case
C-37/00, Weber, concluded that “work carried out on fixed or floating
installations positioned on the continental shelf, in the context of the
prospecting and/or exploitation of natural resources, is to be regarded as work
carried out in the territory of that State for the purposes of applying EU law”.84
In the following paragraph, the Court moved away from the definitions and
used a teleological reasoning to justify its interpretation of territory. It stated
that a “Member State which takes advantage of the economic rights to
prospect and/or exploit natural resources on that part of the continental shelf
which is adjacent to it cannot avoid the application of the EU law provisions
designed to ensure the freedom of movement of persons working on such
installations”.85 In a similar case, Kik, on the application of the same
regulation to a person working on board a pipe-laying vessel, the Court again
used a teleological interpretation to work around the specifically defined
scope of the Regulation.86
80. Mehta, op. cit. supra note 13, at 1411 et seq.
81. Case C-347/10, Salemink.
82. Council Regulation 1407/71 in the version amended and updated by Council Regulation
118/97 of 2 Dec. 1996, O.J. 1997, L 28/1 (as amended by Council Regulation 1606/98 of 29
June 1998, O.J. 1998, L 209/1), Art. 13(2)(a) and (c).
83. Ibid., Art. 13(1), subject to Art. 14c and 14f.
84. Case C-347/10, Salemink, para 35.
85. Ibid., para 60.
86. Case C-266/13, Kik. In this case, the work was not carried out on the territory of the
Member State, the vessel flew the Panamanian flag and the other criteria in the provision
defining the applicability of the Regulation were also not satisfied. The Court therefore
reasoned that there was a “sufficiently close connection with the Union” due to the fact that the
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It thus seems that the Court tried to compensate the potentially undesirable
consequences of the legislature’s imprecision, namely the unforeseen
exclusion of some activities at sea from EU law, with a teleological
interpretation. From the viewpoint of legal certainty, it would have been
preferable if the legislature had been more precise in drafting the provision on
the applicability of the legislative instrument in the first place, rather than
leaving it to the Court to judge the legislature’s intentions.
The legislature’s formulation concerning the applicability of EU law is
more often focused on “territory”. This is evidenced in several other cases,
such as Aktiebolaget and Habitats, concerning respectively the Sixth VAT
Directive and the Habitats Directive.87 The reference to territory was not an
incidental error made in one legislative instrument, but is a recurring
phenomenon which causes problems when legislation is applied to offshore
activities, as the territory of Member States does not extend beyond their
territorial sea.
At the same time, it must be noted that there are also many instruments of
secondary EU law and agreements entered into by the EU, of which the
applicability is clearly defined, with or without the use of the word “territory”.
For example, in the Union Customs Code, the legislature clearly intended to
exclude application to the EEZ and continental shelf when it formulated the
provision on its applicability to include the territories, territorial waters,
internal waters and airspace.88 Another solution, which may be viable
depending on the subject matter, is provided in the Common Fisheries Policy:
application may specifically refer to vessels rather than to territory or
maritime zones.89 Finally, secondary EU law instruments can also refer to
UNCLOS directly, which happened for example in the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive, the applicability of which extends to “the outmost reach
of the area where a Member State has and/or exercises jurisdictional rights, in
headquarters of Mr Kik’s employer were located in Switzerland and that Switzerland was to be
regarded a Member State for the purposes of this Regulation.
87. Respectively, Arts. 2 and 3 of Council Directive 77/388, cited supra note 65, and Art.
2(1) of Council Directive 92/43, cited supra note 61.
88. Regulation (EU) 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 Oct.
2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (recast), O.J. 2013, L 269/1, Art. 4.
89. Council Regulation (EU) 2018/120 of 23 Jan. 2018 fixing for 2018 the fishing
opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and,
for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters, O.J. 2018, L 27/1, Art. 2. However, in
Case C-266/13, Kik, this would not have helped, as the ship in this case flew the Panamanian
flag.
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accordance with the UNCLOS”.90 In light of the analysis above, direct
reference to UNCLOS does not necessarily make the geographical scope clear
beyond doubt, as the chosen wording is essential.
At the same time, we recognize that there may be (political) reasons why the
legislature is not precise in the applicability of legal instruments. For example,
in a case concerning the Western Sahara, the General Court mentioned that the
reference to the Kingdom of Morocco in the relevant association agreement
may have been understood by the Moroccan authorities as including the
contested area the Western Sahara.91 The General Court added that although
the Council and Commission were aware that the authorities took this view,
the Association Agreement with Morocco did not include any interpretation
clause that would have the consequence of excluding that territory from its
applicability.92 By not adopting such a clause, the legislature leaves it to the
Court to solve this politically sensitive matter. Notwithstanding the debate on
the correct interpretation of the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco, the
wording chosen in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement regarding application
at sea, did not focus on territory, as it provides that it applies, inter alia, “to the
territory of Morocco and to the waters under Moroccan jurisdiction”.93
A look to the future shows that expectations concerning the applicability of
EU law at sea during the drafting process may still lie far apart from the legal
reality in the ECJ’s interpretation. For example, in the original proposal of a
recent amendment to the Gas Directive,94 which seems to be linked directly to
the possibility of constructing Nord Stream II, a new gas pipeline through the
Baltic Sea,95 the European Commission proposed to amend the field of
application of the Directive, stating in Article 1 that “interconnector” as
defined in the Directive “means a transmission line which crosses or spans a
border between Member States or between Member States and third countries
up to the border of Union jurisdiction”.96 In the proposal, recital 5 provided
the interpretation that: “The applicability of Directive 2009/73/EC for gas
pipelines to and from third countries remains confined to the territorial limit
90. Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy
(Marine Strategy Framework Directive), O.J. 2008, L 164/19, Art. 2 and Art. 3(1).
91. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council, EU:T:2015:953, para 101.
92. Ibid., para 101; Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:973, para 84.
93. Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Communities and the
Kingdom of Morocco, O.J. 2006, L 141/4, Art. 11. See also Kassoti, “The ECJ and the art of
treaty interpretation:Western Sahara Campaign UK”, 56 CML Rev. (2019), 209–236.
94. COM(2017)660 final, cited supra note 76; as to the Gas Directive, see Directive
2009/73, cited supra note 71.
95. This amendment follows the (leaked) Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council on a
Mandate.
96. COM(2017)660 final, cited supra note 76, Art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
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of the Union’s jurisdiction. As regards offshore pipelines, it should be
applicable in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of the
Member States”.97 This interpretation conflicts with the Court’s case law, as
interconnectors are not linked to the exploitation of natural resources in the
continental shelf or EEZ. Instead, they fall under Article 79 UNCLOS rather
than under Article 56 UNCLOS, which provides that the coastal States do not
have exclusive rights and they cannot regulate interconnectors beyond the
territorial sea.98 This means that EU law cannot be directly or independently
applicable to these pipelines beyond the territorial sea, but only to pipelines
that are used for the exploitation of natural resources.99 In the final version of
the Directive, the text has been amended to include only the territorial sea of
the State in which the first connection point lies.100 Moreover, the reference to
“Union jurisdiction” was removed from Article 1.
In future legislative documents, it is recommendable to refrain from using
the word “territory”, except when explicitly required, such as in the case of the
Union Customs Code. Instead, the legislature could refer to “the Member
States”, which implies that Union law applies where Member States have
jurisdiction, regardless of the legal basis of their jurisdiction. Pursuant to
Article 1 TEU, the Member States have transferred powers to the EU to attain
objectives they have in common. Read in combination with Article 52 TEU,
which provides that the Treaties apply to the Member States, the Treaties do
not seem to provide reason to limit the application of the Treaties or EU law in
general to the territory or the sovereign rights of the Member States. Rather,
the full spectrum of the duties and powers of Member States could be taken
into account. If the Member States want to include such limits or wish to do so
in secondary law, they can accomplish this by elucidating these limits in the
provisions on geographical scope.
97. Ibid., preamble, para 5.
98. Coastal States can regulate interconnectors as soon as they enter their territorial sea. On
the basis of Art. 79 UNCLOS, coastal States do have the right to influence the route of pipelines
on their continental shelf; however, for electricity interconnectors, this is not the case.
99. Cf. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget. As UNCLOS, Art. 79(4) confirms that the coastal
State may establish conditions for cables and pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea –
on the basis of UNCLOS, Art. 2 – EU law may apply depending on whether the rights in
question have been conferred on the EU. Such conditions could affect the project as a whole, if
the coastal State has the right to adopt such conditions on the basis of public international law.
This analysis would require discussion of the conditions which the coastal State may adopt, the
EU acquis in question and their effects, which goes beyond the scope of the current article.
100. Directive 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 Apr. 2019
amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural
gas, O.J. 2019, L 117/1, recital 9.
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4.2. Role of the ECJ
While the legislature should take up its role to draft the provisions relating to
the applicability of legislative instruments carefully, the ECJ also has to be
careful with regard to the intricate differences between “sovereignty”,
“territory” and “sovereign rights” in international law. Three things are
important in this regard.
4.2.1. Conformity with public international law
First, it is important that conclusions by the ECJ are in conformity with public
international law. Doubt can be cast on whether this was the case for the
reasoning of the ECJ inWeber, which supported the conclusion that work on
the continental shelf can be regarded as being carried out as though in the
territory of the coastal State in light of Article 29 VCLT.101 Article 29 VCLT
provides: “unless another intention appears from the treaty, a treaty is binding
in respect of the entire territory of the contracting party”.102 The sensitivity of
the definition of “territory” in public international law and in particular in the
context of Article 29 VCLT is well illustrated by Akehurst. He noted that,
during the VCLT negotiations, the delegate from the UK placed on record his
“understanding that the expression ‘its entire territory’ applied solely to the
territory over which a party to the treaty in question exercised its sovereignty”,
which was not challenged by any other delegate.103
Akehurst noted that this may give rise to difficulties as States may have
international responsibility and treaty-making power in respect of a particular
area, without necessarily having territorial sovereignty over this area.104 The
continental shelf and EEZ are examples of areas in which a State enjoys such
international responsibility and treaty-making powers, without enjoying
territorial sovereignty.
Despite the ECJ’s efforts to link the sovereign rights which coastal States
enjoy to territorial sovereignty and to view them as an extension thereof,
neither the EEZ nor the continental shelf is part of the territory of the coastal
State in accordance with public international law. When the EEZ was
introduced, several theories were put forward regarding its legal status.105 The
claim that territorial sovereignty would extend to the EEZ received little
101. Case C-37/00,Weber.
102. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
103. Akehurst, Encyclopedia of International Law (1980), referring to UN Conference on
the Law of Treaties, First Session, Official Records, UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 (1969), p. 429.
104. Ibid., p. 990.
105. For an overview, see Kwiatkowska, The Exclusive Economic Zone (Martinus Nijhoff,
1989), pp. 230–234.
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attention as the discussion focused on whether the EEZ was still part of the
high seas or was a sui generis zone.106 Following the interpretation of Article
29 VCLT, according to Akehurst and in the broader context of public
international law as mentioned, the entire territory of a State does not include
its EEZ or continental shelf. The ECJ thus seems to formulate a broader
interpretation of Article 29 VCLT without clearly acknowledging this.
This raises the question regarding the available alternatives to the Court in
this and other cases. To begin with, the Court could have ruled that the
continental shelf falls outside the territory of the State involved and thus
outside the scope of application of the Brussels Convention in line with
Article 29 VCLT. While this may attract the required attention of the
legislature, this would have significantly limited the rights of Mr Weber and
others in similar positions. Depending on the drafting of the legal instrument
and other circumstances involved, the ECJ may have different possibilities.
For instance, the Court may be able to rely on the fact that Article 29 VCLT
provides that a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory
“unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established”.Alternatively, where secondary law is concerned, the Court is not
unfamiliar with reference to the object and purpose of the legislation when
ruling on its applicability.107
In light of the available alternatives, it should be noted that the Court has
been offered assistance by its Advocate General in several cases. One such
occasion was the Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Salemink. In
the same vein as set out above, Mr Cruz Villalón clearly identified that there
are no grounds to discriminate between the source of the powers conferred by
the Member States to the EU.108 He explained, for example, that it did not
actually matter whether the source was sovereignty or sovereign rights by
virtue of UNCLOS.109 Referring to the decision in Habitats, Mr Cruz Villalón
stated that the Court has relied on precisely this criterion (i.e. the competences
actually conferred) in previous judgments.110 However, as set out above, in
Habitats the Court used a different line of reasoning to reach its decision.111
Despite Mr Cruz Villalón’s attention for the source of powers, his Opinion did
not mark a turning point in the case law of the ECJ, as that case law continued
to rely on sovereignty and sovereign rights.
106. Ibid.; see also, Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed. (Manchester
University Press, 1999), pp. 165–166.
107. As mentioned supra in section 2.3.
108. Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-347/10, Salemink, EU:C:2011:562, paras.
54–55.
109. Ibid., para 56.
110. Ibid., para 57.
111. Case C-6/04, Habitats, para 117.
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4.2.2. Coherence of the ECJ’s reasoning
The coherence of the ECJ’s reasoning also deserves attention.
In Weber, the ECJ set itself the task of establishing whether the work
carried out by Mr Weber in the Netherlands continental shelf area should be
regarded as being carried out in the territory of the Netherlands in light of
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention.112 In paragraph 27, the ECJ started by
stating that this provision does not apply to contracts carried out completely
outside the territory of a contracting State, adding, in paragraph 28, that the
contract must have a connection with the territory of a contracting State. In
paragraph 29, the ECJ explicitly referenced Article 29 VCLT and included its
text.The ECJ continued that those are the factors which determine whether or
not work carried out in the Netherlands continental shelf area is to be regarded
as being carried out in the territory of the Netherlands. The ECJ then ruled, in
paragraph 31, that the Brussels Convention did not contain a provision
governing that aspect of its scope. Following this reasoning of the ECJ, the
logical consequence would be to apply Article 29 VCLT. Yet this provision
was not mentioned again in the subsequent reasoning in the judgment, as the
ECJ instead concluded that reference must be made to the legal regime
applicable to the continental shelf, in particular the Geneva Convention.
The ECJ then stated, in paragraphs 32 to 34, that the coastal State enjoys
exclusive sovereign rights for the purposes of exploitation and exploration of
the natural resources of the continental shelf. The ECJ recalled that the
International Court of Justice had ruled that as the continental shelf forms a
natural prolongation of the land, these sovereign rights exist as an extension of
and by virtue of the sovereignty of the coastal State over the land. In paragraph
35, the ECJ then observed that it was in conformity with those principles of
public international law that a provision of Dutch law proclaimed that Dutch
courts have jurisdiction in disputes regarding contracts of employees working
on mining installations on the Dutch continental shelf. As a result, the ECJ
concluded, in paragraph 36, that the work carried out by an employee on fixed
or floating installations on or above the continental shelf of a contracting State
for the mentioned purposes should be regarded as work carried out in the
territory of that State for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) of the Brussels
Convention.
The ECJ did not explicitly mention each step in its reasoning which could
support its conclusion. The elaborate reference to the rules of public
international law may support the finding that the work has a connection with
one of the contracting States, a requirement the ECJ formulated (para 28). The
ECJ did not refer back to this requirement, however. The ECJ ruled, in
paragraphs 29 and 30, that in accordance with the VCLT, it should be tested
112. Case C-37/00,Weber, para 30.
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whether the work was to be regarded as carried out in the territory of the
Netherlands. With the choice of words in its conclusion, the ECJ seemed to
directly try and answer this test based on Article 29 VCLT. Considering that
the work was carried out above the continental shelf, application of Article 29
VCLT would require discussion of whether the continental shelf is part of the
territory of a coastal State according to public international law. The ECJ did
not discuss this but instead focused on sovereignty. Assuming the Court
indeed applied Article 29 VCLT, the reference to Dutch law, in paragraph 35,
seems out of place in an analysis on whether the continental shelf is part of the
territory of the Netherlands in accordance with public international law.
4.2.3. Accuracy
Third, and finally, it is important that the ECJ is accurate and precise in its
formulations. For example, in Aktiebolaget, the ECJ referred to “sea” as a
maritime zone.113 Based on the Court’s description of this area as being
“outside the sovereignty of any State” with reference to Article 89 UNCLOS
on the freedom of the high seas, the ECJ must have intended to refer to the high
seas as a maritime zone.114 The Court stated that the part of the transaction
carried out at “sea” falls outside the applicability of the Sixth Directive, even
though there is no high seas area between Sweden and other Member States.115
This reasoning by the ECJ is puzzling and seems inaccurate in both phrasing
and applicability to the cable between Sweden and another Member State.
Another example of an issue in relation to accuracy concerns due regard to
potential future consequences of a certain way of reasoning. For instance, the
ECJ could have used a different formulation in Habitats leading to the same
legal conclusion, namely applicability of the Habitats Directive to activities in
the EEZ and the continental shelf, without limiting the applicability of EU law
at sea to sovereign rights and thereby impacting subsequent cases. In her
Opinion in the Habitats case, Advocate General Kokott mentioned that
attainment of the goals of the Directive in the sense of the protection of species
is impossible without application of the Directive beyond territorial seas. In
that context she referred to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
113. Case C-111/05, Aktiebolaget, para 60. The exact formulation: “The same is true, a
fortiori, of that part of the transaction which is carried out at sea, a zone which, pursuant to
Article 89 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, is outside the sovereignty of any State”.
114. Art. 89 UNCLOS concerns the high seas. A comparable argument to that made by the
ECJ, but correctly formulated, can be found in the Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case
C-347/10, Salemink.
115. The States around the North Sea and Baltic Sea all declared an EEZ and are located
closer than 400 nautical miles to each other, which means that both seas are entirely divided in
EEZs and do not feature an area of high seas beyond national jurisdiction of any State.
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which applies to: “processes and activities, regardless of where their effects
occur, carried out under [a Contracting Party’s] jurisdiction or control, within
the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction”.116 This is formulated broadly, in order to avoid explicit
exclusion of the powers which States enjoy, for example in the EEZ and
continental shelf. However, the rule which Advocate General Kokott
formulated in her Opinion reads as follows: “The Habitats Directive is
therefore also to be transposed in respect of areas outside territorial waters, in
so far as the Member States or the Community exercise sovereign rights
there.”.117
Unfortunately, the Court partly followed this formulation rather than that of
the CDB. A small difference in formulation could have prevented many
difficulties. If the words “sovereign rights” were replaced by “jurisdiction and
control” or “rights or duties” in the reasoning above, this would have allowed
for more room to extend the applicability of EU law to activities at sea and
avoiding reliance on sovereign rights.
5. Conclusion
Analysis of the case law of the ECJ thus allows two trends to be discerned.
First, in its case law, the ECJ has made the determining factor for the question
whether EU law is applicable at sea whether an activity falls within the
sovereign rights of coastal States in light of either Article 56 or 77 UNCLOS.
The consequence is that activities which the coastal State is allowed or
obligated to regulate pursuant to any other legal basis in UNCLOS fall outside
the criterion defined by the ECJ and are systematically excluded from the field
of application of EU legislation.This relates for example to maritime research,
environmental conservation, and the construction of artificial islands and
structures.
When reviewing the case law, it seems as if the limitation may initially have
slipped accidentally into the reasoning of the ECJ, through cases such as
Weber,Habitats and Salemink, where the reliance on sovereign rights acted as
a means to include activities in the EEZ and above the continental shelf within
the field of application of EU law. In Aktiebolaget and Kik, however, these
sovereign rights were in turn explicitly used as outer limits of EU competence.
This criterion thus excludes certain activities which coastal States carry out on
another legal basis of UNCLOS than sovereign rights, such as jurisdiction.
116. Rio de Janiero, 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, Art. 4(b).
117. Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-6/04, Habitats, para 135.
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The second trend is the sometimes inconsistent use of terminology, both by
the EU legislature and, subsequently, by the Court. The EU legislature
sometimes refers to “territory” when defining the applicability of its
legislation without assessing the consequences of this wording for activities at
sea. In other instruments, the geographical scope is not mentioned at all. The
Court has avoided the possibly undesired exclusion from EU law of all
activities taking place outside the territory but within the jurisdiction of
Member States.
From the point of view of legal certainty and consistency, the EU legislature
should be more precise in its formulation of the applicability of legal
instruments. For the same reasons of legal certainty and consistency, it is also
recommended that the ECJ pays particular attention to its formulation, use and
interpretation of the terms territory, sovereign rights and jurisdiction. The
drafting needs to be more careful, and the reasoning better enunciated. In
addition, it is essential that the ECJ provides appropriate legal reasoning when
including or excluding a certain activity from the applicability of EU law.
To conclude: both the Court and the legislature have a responsibility to
ensure that the applicability of EU legislation in the continental shelf and EEZ
is clear. While both the Court and legislature have been presented with ample
opportunities to change their course along the lines of our recommendations,
the approach taken by Court and new legislative proposals emphasizes that
their attention to these matters is required in order not to lose sight of port.
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